International Digital Policy Observatory (IDPO) is a publicly accessible, real-time database with enhanced analytical tools that tracks developments in digital, internet, and emerging technology regulation across multiple countries. 

international-digital-policy-observatory

_Policy complexity_

Cybersecurity is a complex policy issue due to multidimensional threats spanning legacy systems, skills shortages, human error, supply chain issues, plus environmental disruptions on digital infrastructure ([ENISA, 2024](https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/foresight-cybersecurity-threats-for-2030-update-2024-executive-summary)). Such complexity is heightened across the range of attributes impacting cybersecurity policy development, such as: telecommunication, network, cloud computing, e-commerce, online banking, smart grid, consumer rights, cybercrime, encryption, privacy, identity theft, digital signature, data security, and spam ([Mishra et al., 2022](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404822002140)). 

_Policy uncertainty_ 

Pressure and uncertainty about governance abounds as the number of [data breaches](https://informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/) and [cyber attacks](https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents) intensify across all sectors and jurisdictions. Cybersecurity policy is therefore never static, but rather a continuous process spanning multiple attributes: governance, identification, protection, detection, response, and recovery efforts ([NIST, 2024](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/29/the-nist-cybersecurity-framework-csf-20/final)).

_Policymaking possibilities_

National strategies, such as the Australian Cyber Security Strategy emphasise the need for continual and close consultation with industry and community to achieve national cyber resilience ([Australian Government, 2023](https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/cyber-security-subsite/files/2023-cyber-security-strategy.pdf)). Ultimately there is no one-size-fits all policy approach to cybersecurity - as each organisation (industry, government, academic, or nonprofit) will vary in relation to its risk appetite and tolerance, technologies, mission, and objectives ([NIST, 2024](https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/cswp/29/the-nist-cybersecurity-framework-csf-20/final)).

cybersecurity

Cybersecurity

Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0

academic-journal-articles-cybersecurity

International Digital Policy Observatory

Scholar_Cyber_Security.csv

Academic-Journal-Articles-Cybersecurity

CC-BY-SA-4.0

news-headlines-cybersecurity

Cyber_Security_News.csv

News-Headlines-Cybersecurity

_Policy complexity_

Online harm practices are associated with multidimensional risks: content (production, distribution, and consumption), contact (a result of online interactions), and conduct (behaviour facilitated by technology) ([WEF, 2023](https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Typology_of_Online_Harms_2023.pdf)). More broadly, sociotechnical harms take into account the micro-, meso-, and macro-level impacts of algorithmic systems such as: representational harms, allocative harms, quality of service harms, interpersonal harms - and social system harms ([Shelby et al., 2023](https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3600211.3604673)).

_Policy uncertainty_

Consensus from diverse stakeholders about the urgent need to combat online harms has meant more governments are “looking to replace the current patchwork of discrete laws and voluntary initiatives with more holistic regulation” ([Linklaters, 2021](https://www.allens.com.au/globalassets/pdfs/insights/linklaters-insights/linklaters_online-harms-a-comparative-analysis.pdf), p.3). Yet there remains a lack of consensus across jurisdictions about how to regulate online content (ibid).

_Policymaking possibilities_

There is growing awareness about the need for government, industry, and civil society to tackle online harms via collaboration, education, and legislation ([Global Government Forum, 2022](https://www.globalgovernmentforum.com/collaboration-education-and-legislation-how-governments-are-tackling-online-harms/)). Building a shared understanding about online harms - as well as comparative analyses of regulatory regimes - can inform interdisciplinary communication and multi-stakeholder discussions to richly advance policies and interventions.

online-content-regulation

Online Content Regulation

news-headlines-online-content-regulation

Online_Content_News.csv

News-Headlines-Online-Content-Regulation

spotify-cybersecurity

Cybersecurity_Spotify.csv

Spotify-Cybersecurity

policy-documents-cybersecurity

Cybersecurity_Google.csv

Policy-Documents-Cybersecurity

youtube-cybersecurity

Cyber_Security_Youtube.csv

Youtube - Cybersecurity

policy-documents-online-content-regulation

Online_Content_Regulation_Google.csv

Policy-Documents-Online-Content-Regulation

_Policy complexity_

Misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation have become critical policy issues due to their social and political implications around the world amid increasingly complex media ecosystem dynamics ([Balkan & Ülgen, 2023](https://edam.org.tr/uploads/yukleme\_resim/Report-Disinformation-Malinformation-Misinformation.pdf). Yet academic, public, and political sector attempts to define the concept of misinformation remain both inconsistent and contradictory, as misinformation can be framed in relation to multiple forces such as audiences, intermediaries, and producers. ([Zeng & Brennan, 2023](https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/misinformation)). As such, defining ‘problematically inaccurate information’ ([Jack, 2017](https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/DataAndSociety_LexiconofLies.pdf)) remains a persistent challenge - especially as intentionality and accuracy “may be particularly hard to parse in the context of networked media, accelerating news cycles, and declining faith in social institutions” (p.1).

_Policy uncertainty_

In examining a range of policy, conceptual, and evaluative challenges associated with [Countering Disinformation Effectively](https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Carnegie_Countering_Disinformation_Effectively.pdf), Bateman and Jackson (2024) propose: there is no silver bullet or ‘best’ policy option; policymakers should set realistic expectations; democracies should adopt a portfolio approach to manage uncertainty; long-term structural reforms deserve more attention; platforms and tech cannot be the sole focus; countering disinformation is not always apolitical; and, research gaps are pervasive (pp. 2-3)

_Policymaking possibilities_

Closely examining mis/dis/malinformation policies across a range of international organisations and countries potentially offers not only a comparative and critical perspective, but also signals the need for a multi-stakeholder approach to develop effective dialogue and decision-making across the globe (Balkan & Ülgen, 2023). The future of the misinformation field requires not only more interdisciplinary work, but also collecting international data, studying the subtleties of misinformation and a wider range of platforms, alongside the development of theories, frameworks, and interventions (Altay et al., 2023).

misinformation

Misinformation

academic-journal-articles-misinformation

Academic-Journal-Articles-Misinformation.csv

Academic-Journal-Articles-Misinformation

_Policy complexity_

AI regulation is a major policy issue which no single stakeholder, organisation, or country can address in isolation - a multi-layered approach toward laws, standards, and best practices is required ([Weissinger, 2022](https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/41989/chapter-abstract/355438981?redirectedFrom=fulltext)). Global AI governance would benefit from a ‘regime complex’ to advance: authoritative knowledge on the state of AI science; common standards and harmonization of AI regulations; equitable access and benefit sharing; plus promoting collective security. ([Klein & Patrick, 2024](https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/03/21/envisioning-global-regime-complex-to-govern-artificial-intelligence-pub-92022)).

_Policy uncertainty_

Yet uncertainty prevails about policy mechanisms that could fully encompass - and address - diverse jurisdictional, organisational, and stakeholder interests. For instance, the extent to which existing regulations (such as consumer, competition, privacy and anti-discrimination laws) are adequate, or require amendment or extension - must be fully considered prior to designing specific AI-regulations ([King, 2024](https://www.pc.gov.au/media-speeches/articles/ai-regulation)).

_Policymaking possibilities_

The combined efforts of sovereign states, intergovernmental organizations, and nonstate actors can shape multidimensional governance possibilities ([Klein & Patrick, 2024](https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/03/21/envisioning-global-regime-complex-to-govern-artificial-intelligence-pub-92022)). In Australia, principles to guide governance possibilities include: a risk-based approach; being balanced and proportionate - as well as collaborative, transparent and a trusted international partner; plus, community first and ensuring that “AI is designed, developed and deployed to consider the needs, abilities and social context of people” ([Department of Industry, Science and Resources, 2024, p.19](https://storage.googleapis.com/converlens-au-industry/industry/p/prj2452c8e24d7a400c72429/public_assets/safe-and-responsible-ai-in-australia-governments-interim-response.pdf)).